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Common Sense in Science
Linguistic Aspects of Common 
Sense
Common sense (lat.: sensus com­
munis) is associated with right deci-
sions or judges based on correct perception of things. The word “com-
mon” suggests, that it must be something universal, something common 
to all people. However, meaning of this concept is not as clear as one can 
expect. First question one can ask is: “what does it mean that decisions or 
judgments are right?” On the other hand, there are many similar words 
like e.g.: good sense, gumption, practical wisdom,1 judgment, reason, 
prudence etc. and it is not easy to clarify and distinguish among them.
More light on this term could be shed by other languages, though it is 
important to remember that these translations are not straightforward in 
all contexts. In Polish: “common sense” is translated as rozsądek. This word 
has two parts: roz­ and ­sądzić means: “to pass a judgement”. In addition, 
it is often connected with word: zdrowy2 what does mean that this judge 
is right.3 In German, word Verstand,4 is a translation of “common sense,” 
but this concept comes from verstehen – “to understand.” The French 
correspondent is bon sense, with emphasis on good or right recognition.
 1 Barry Schwartz, American psychologist, in the title of his book, gives his own simple defini-
tion of practical wisdom, as “the right way to do the right thing.” (B. Schwartz, K. Sharpe, Practical 
Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the Right Thing, New York 2011.
 2 Zdrowy literally means “helathy.”
 3 See Rozsądek, in: W. Boryś, Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego, Kraków 2008, p. 522.
 4 A German analogue to Polish zdrowy rozsądek, is gesunden Verstand.
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Common Sense in Philosophy
Equally important as language connections are philosophical meanings 
of common sense. First mentioning’s thereof one can find in Aristotle’s 
philosophy of perception. In On the Soul,5 he explains relations between 
senses used by animals and humans to distinguish things and he claims 
that to perceive characteristics of them, there must be something more 
which is related to rationality. This ability of animal soul is universal and 
this is common sense indeed:
But for the commons we have even now a common sense, not incidentally. There 
is, then, no special [sense] for them; for if so we should not perceive them otherwise 
than as stated, as we see the son of Cleon.6
The question which elements of human cognition and language are 
human -specific and which are characteristic of both humans and animals, 
or whether the differences between humans and animals in his regard are 
more quantitative or qualitative have been subject to scientific research. 
Examples include the controversies about the role of recursion in human 
language, researches concerning the presence of context -free grammar 
in starlings’ songs, the search for grammar in American Sign Language 
used by Great Apes, semantically compositional syntax in honeybees’ 
dance or elsewhere and many others.7
Descartes created his own concept of common sense as a synonym 
to reason. For him it is an ability common to all people which helps dis-
tinguish between true and false:
 5 In Greek Peri Psyche, in Latin De anima.
 6 Aristotle, On the Soul, 3. 425a 27.
 7 See S. Napierała, Comparison of human and animal syntax, an unpublished BA dissertation 
(2007); and S. Napierała, The Controversies About Recursion in the Narrow Syntax and Language 
Evolution, an unpublished MA dissertation (2009).
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Good sense8 is the best shared -out thing in the world; for everyone thinks he has 
such a good supply of it that he doesn’t want more, even if he is extremely hard to 
please about other things. Since it’s not likely that everyone is mistaken about this, it is 
evidence that the power of judging well and of telling the true from the false—which 
is what we properly call “good sense” or “reason”—is naturally equal in all men.9
This is something purely different from Aristotle theory, but it gives 
new way of defining “sensus communis” and that is why the Aristotelian 
meaning is forgotten today:
Descartes is the source of the most common meaning of “common sense” today: 
practical judgement.10
At the end of 18th century, Thomas Reid founded the so -called Scottish 
school of Common Sense as an opposition to skepticism of Hume and 
Locke. As an alternative hypothesis of perception, they proposed a naïve 
realism – conception, which was based and justified via introspection. 
In the light of this perspective one should understand the definition of 
common sense as follows:
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our 
nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in 
the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them – these 
are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to 
them, is what we call absurd.11
 8 In French: bon sense.
 9 R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method and the Meditations, trans. J. Veitch, New York 2008, 
p. 11.
 10 J. Schaeffer, Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism, London–Durham 
1990, p. 2.
 11 Ried on Common Sense, in: N. Wolterstorff, Practices of Belief. Selected Essays, vol. 2, New 
York 2009, p. 376.
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Some principles are common for every people, but no one can justify 
them, so only human nature enforces us to believe in them, and this is ex-
actly common sense. But in context of Ried’s philosophy, this term is not 
clear, because it is not so easy to find examples of these certain principles 
in accordance with the definition above.12
In the 20th century new light on common sense was shed by George 
Moore. His philosophy was important part of the beginning of analytic 
tradition and comeback to realism. In his opinion, common sense is good 
tool to judge philosophical views and it must be the starting point for 
creating own philosophy. Analytic philosophers claimed that theorems 
that are understandable but unexplainable, exist, e.g. cognition. Common 
sense consists of these convictions.13
Given the circumstances, common sense is something like common 
ability of all people to perceive things correctly and judge them right to 
make good decisions. They may be other definitions, but this one in-
cludes every important part: universality, human acting, epistemology 
and judging.
Now getting this altogether, one can ask the question – how can com-
mon sense exist in science? If one compares the definition above with 
science, one can see common characteristics: science is something uni-
versal, it is human ability, it is about things and relations among them, 
scientific method is the way of perceiving, theories and its predications 
are still verified to judge them as true or false.
On the other side, science is very diversified. There are modern sci-
ence and humanities and each one includes many disciplines with dif-
ferent methods. Is that possible that common sense could be practical 
and universal tool above all methods? The positive answer one can find 
in Michal Heller’s philosophy.
 12 D. Kucharski, Natura przedmiotu spostrzeżenia zmysłowego w ujęciu Thomasa Reida, „Studia 
Philosophiae Christianae” 48 (2012) nr 3, p. 55–75.
 13 See W. Tatarkiewicz, Historia filozofii, t. 3, Warszawa 2009, p. 256–264.
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Michał Heller’s Philosophy
Michał Heller is Polish theologian, philosopher, cosmologist, and 
a Catholic priest. In 2008, he was awarded Templeton’s prize.14 He is 
a professor of philosophy at the Pontifical University of John Paul II in 
Cracow and an adjunct member of the Vatican Observatory staff. His 
philosophy is interdisciplinary, he connects science, philosophy and the-
ology but not mixes them. He treats them as separated disciplines, but as 
he believes, in cooperation they can elucidate many problems. His well-
-known idea is the mathematicity of the World.
Heller, in his global view on science, proposes a universal and objective 
method – critical rationalism, which is his way of practicing philosophy 
and science. It is very important to realize that this is not his postulate, 
but it is just attractive proposition. Critical rationalism is not an original 
idea of Heller. This concept comes from Karl Popper’s philosophy and it 
is about theories of science:
How can we hope to detect and eliminate error? I believe, by criticizing the theo-
ries or guesses of others and – if we can train ourselves to do so – by criticizing our 
own theories or guesses. […] This answer sums up a position which I propose to call 
“critical rationalism”.15
These sentences should relate to falsificationism, but it is not only 
about empirical verification, but also about self -reflection in one’s own 
mind. Popper claims that it is impossible to find a certain method to ver-
ify possessed knowledge. The only way is to approximate to the truth by 
continued criticism based on rationality. To understand Popper’s idea, it 
may be necessary to review his whole philosophy, but it is not the point 
of this article.
 14 See Previous Prize ­Winners. Michał Heller, http://www.templetonprize.org/previouswinners/
heller.html (15.04.2017).
 15 K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London 2002, 
p. 34.
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Heller in his reflections refers to Popper’s views, considering him 
an inspirer in developing his own philosophical conception, which can 
qualify Heller to Popperism. Direct reference is evident in Heller’s early 
philosophical searches:
I think that in the history of nature philosophy Popper’s thought will also play 
a key role […] Representatives of the natural sciences, after acquainting themselves 
with the views of this philosopher, very often recognize them as their own,16
and
If Popper’s call for critical rationality becomes a sign of contemporary thought, 
then at least we will not have to be ashamed of our children.17
Also in relation to critical rationalism this similarity of thought is 
visible. However, as will be shown later, the views of the Polish philoso-
pher are not merely a continuation or a creative development of Popper’s 
thought but a separate and independent worldview. Critical rationalism 
should therefore be regarded as a certain method of practicing the phi-
losophy that Heller uses, not as belonging to a certain direction in mod-
ern philosophy.
In later works Heller no longer writes about critical rationalism, but 
just applies it. In science, he espouses falsificationism as a criterion for 
science, analyzes metaphysical assumptions and philosophical concepts 
applied in science. He is interested in linguistic issues related to the inter-
pretation of theories. Also, he points out problems of multiverse theory 
and the Theory of Everything. When he speaks about the mathematical 
nature of the universe, he explicitly states that this is just a hypothesis, 
as he opposes the creation of any system of the world. All these issues 
 16 M. Heller, Filozofia świata, Kraków 1992, p. 164–165. Self -translation (in all quotes from 
Heller’s book written in Polish language).
 17 M. Heller, Usprawiedliwienie Wszechświata, Kraków 1984, p. 12.
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incudes criticism connected with rationalism. Scientist should not only 
try to build new theories, but self -reflects on his previous works and 
discoveries.
Ethics and Methodology
As shown above, Heller practices critical rationalism in similar way to 
Popper’s. On the other hand, in Heller’s philosophy one can find some-
thing which is characteristic of him. The greatest difference can be seen 
in the everyday practice of a scientist and a philosopher. In his book Jak 
być uczonym?,18 what does mean “how to be a scholar?”, he connects 
methodology of science with ethics:19
Methodology of work is a collection of technical prescriptions, how to work 
well. But scientific work is of a special kind. In the scientific work, the collection of 
techniques will remain powerless if it does not penetrate deeper layers of the psyche. 
Techniques […] must transform into a style of being. […] All this makes the meth-
odology of scientific work must also be its ethics.20
But on the other hand:
The ethics of scientific work should seek an alliance with techniques. Ethics with-
out techniques and techniques without ethics are ineffectual.21
For this reason, he does not distinguish which of his propositions for 
scientists are methodological and which are ethical. So, what is the answer 
for the question – how to be a scholar? There are few elements needed:
 18 M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, Kraków 2009.
 19 Sometimes Heller uses words “ethics” and “morality” as synonyms, what is incorrect.
 20 M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, op. cit., p. 17.
 21 M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, op. cit., p. 18.
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Diagram 1. Ethics and Methodology in Science and Philosophy
First line shows characteristics of the scientist or philosopher. If 
he wants to find them as his own, he must do an introspection. Self-
-objectivism is an ability to perceive oneself from many different per-
spectives. Self -criticism is a capability that helps to reject one’s own men-
tality and way of thinking. Humility is a virtue, which help to judge 
oneself right, to see oneself advantages, disadvantages, talents, and lim-
its. Discipline in thinking is a good organization of work. Moderation 
is a happy medium in acting.22
Passion, as Heller claims, is a complicated concept. He shows seven 
aspects of it (presented in the second line). Scientist or philosopher with 
passion should be interested in subject and find pleasure in researches. 
 22 See M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, op. cit. p. 18–19, and 26–39.
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He must have “bravery to be a little different,” because life of scientist or 
philosopher is unlike the other people’s life, even for this reason that he 
has other priorities and must resign from part of social relations. Every 
scientist must work in institution – university, laboratory etc., because 
now it is the only way to practicing science. Everyone, who treats his own 
discipline seriously, should reeds many books and journals. It is obvious, 
that all of this involves spending time “at the desk.” True passion must 
be based on real motivation, because without it, passion can fade away. 
Heller points out, that there are many possible reasons to practice sci-
ence, but he lists four: for fun, for humanity, for the truth as a value, and 
for the Truth as God (religious motivation).23
As one can see, these things are not strictly methodology and ethics, 
these are just Heller’s thoughts based on his every -day reality. He is very 
successful, and famous philosopher and cosmologist, and could be an 
authority and his advices may be very helpful.
Heller points out that except ethics and methodology one more thing 
is needed to be a true scholar. He names it “an asceticism of science work” 
and again this concept “asceticism” is not clearly the same as usual mean-
ing. It is not a resignation from something in one’s life, it is rather a choice 
to follow the truth or Truth (logos or Logos). So, except traditional tech-
niques and methods, very helpful is contemplation of the Truth. It could 
give fascination, and fascination finally is the biggest motivation. This 
kind of asceticism could be seen as something similar to mysticism and 
something very different from science, or even contradictory to it. To 
avoid misunderstandings, Heller underlines the role of self -criticism and 
common sense in contemplation indeed.24
After this reflections on practicing philosophy and science, Heller 
poses the question: “May philosophy be a way of life?,” and gives positive 
answer. Philosophy as “friendship with Wisdom”25 is some kind of spiri-
tuality and the way of life indeed. In Heller’s opinion, the true philosopher 
 23 See M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, op. cit., p. 19–23.
 24 See M. Heller, Jak być uczonym?, op. cit., p. 43–52.
 25 In Greek: philo sophia.
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has characteristics easy to recognize: openness for discussions, ability 
to listen with understanding, open -mindedness, clearness of thinking, 
realism,26 self -criticism and intellectual honesty.27 Everyone who knows 
Michał Heller in person, can easily find this characteristic in him and it 
is the best proof for positive answer for question above.
Summary
This specific understanding of methodology connected with ethics and 
even asceticism may give the impression that it is not a critical rationalism. 
But similarities are clearly visible. First line of diagram shows indispensable 
elements of self -criticism. The second line outlines what scientist or phi-
losopher needs for gaining knowledge, without which objectivism is impos-
sible. Objectivism and criticism are two main aspects of critical rationalism.
Finally, one more question – is critical rationalism a common sense 
applied to science? Let’s remind the definition of common sense – it is 
common ability of all people to perceive things correctly and judge them 
right to make good decisions. If one looks back to elements of critical 
rationalism in Heller’s philosophy, easily can find human abilities like 
self -criticism, passion, virtues like humility, moderation, and discipline 
(first line of diagram). Criticism connected with rationality is verification 
of perceiving things. Moreover, self -criticism is very helpful in making 
good decisions, because it is self -reflection and it is recognition of one’s 
motivation, and reasons. In a word, critical rationalism is commonsensi-
cal way of practicing science.
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Abstract
Common Sense in Science
Common sense is an ability common to all people and it is related to right judges 
based on correct perception. These elements are very important in science too, so com-
mon sense could be a universal method of dialog among different disciplines. Critical ra-
tionalism of Karl Popper, as a method of verification theories, is a reflection about human 
perception, it is the way to know the truth and it is objective judging. Polish philosopher 
Michał Heller points out a characteristics which are necessary to be a good scientist and 
philosopher: self -criticism, objectivism, and discipline in thinking etc., which are com-
mon with Popper’s idea. The aim of this article is to show that Heller’s critical rationalism 
is commonsensical way of practicing science and philosophy.
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Abstrakt
Zdrowy rozsądek w nauce
Zdrowy rozsądek jest zdolnością wspólną dla wszystkich ludzi i jest związany z właś-
ciwymi sądami opartymi na poprawnym poznaniu. Te elementy są również bardzo ważne 
w nauce, więc zdrowy rozsądek może być uniwersalną metodą dialogu pomiędzy różnymi 
dyscyplinami. Krytyczny racjonalizm Karla Poppera jako metoda weryfikacji teorii jest 
refleksją nad ludzkim poznaniem, sposobem poznawania prawdy i obiektywnym osądza-
niem. Polski filozof Michał Heller wskazuje kilka cech charakteru, które są konieczne, by 
być dobrym naukowcem lub filozofem i które są wspólne z ideą Poppera: samokrytycyzm, 
obiektywizm, dyscyplina w myśleniu itd. Celem tego artykułu jest pokazanie, że krytycz-
ny racjonalizm Hellera jest zdroworozsądkowym sposobem uprawiania nauki i filozofii.
Słowa klucze
zdrowy rozsądek, nauka, filozofia, Michał Heller, krytyczny racjonalizm
